by Joanne Wallis, Czes Tubilewicz
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
FOREIGN affairs spokeswoman Penny Wong has described Australia’s inability to dissuade the Solomon Islands from signing a security agreement with China as the “worst failure of Australian foreign policy in the Pacific” in almost 80 years.
This agreement seemingly confirms the Australian government’s anxiety about China’s growing influence in the Pacific Islands, and it does raise challenging strategic questions for Australia. But such an alarmist assessment fails to acknowledge that Australia’s ability to influence Pacific Island states has always been more imagined than real.
Admittedly, the Coalition government has made policy mistakes and has missed opportunities that could have strengthened Australia’s relationships in the Pacific. This has undercut Australia’s ability to pursue its strategic interest in being the region’s primary security partner.
Perhaps Australia’s most obvious mistake has been failing to take serious action to address climate change. When speaking in Canberra in 2019, Collin Beck, the Permanent Secretary of the Solomon Islands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, described climate change as a “death sentence for the Pacific”.
But examples of mistakes by governments of both political stripes stretch back to the colonial era. What is new is that other powers have become increasingly assertive in the Pacific, which has forced Australia to be reactive. While trying to “step-up” in the Pacific, Australia has been caught on the back foot.
Interpreting the security agreement as Australia’s failure and confirmation of China’s effective challenge to Australia’s assumed primacy in the Pacific overlooks the complex ways in which power is exercised in the region.
First, there is not a neat causal relationship between a state having a presence in the Pacific (such as by giving aid, making loans, or building infrastructure) and gaining influence that might allow it to coerce or interfere in a Pacific state. If there was such a relationship, then Australia should have been able to prevent the Solomon Islands government from signing the security agreement. Afterall, Australia has long had the most substantial presence of any state in Solomon Islands, not least through the 2003-2017 Regional Assistance Mission.
Second, state governments are not the only actors in the Pacific. It is well established that China acts not only through its central agencies, but also via a range of other actors, from provincial authorities, to state-owned enterprises, to ostensibly private associations, and even individuals.
And this point holds even more for the Pacific, where actors at the regional, national, sub-national, community, and individual levels all seek to exercise power. Focusing only on what national governments are saying and doing misses these complex webs of authority and influence.
Third, attempts to influence a government do not just go in one direction. Countries being courted can use the attention for their own interests. The Solomon Islands government has leveraged the security agreement for both domestic and international gain.
Indeed, a government seeking to influence can even become dependent on their target. Taiwan relies on diplomatic recognition by a diminishing number of Pacific states. In the Solomon Islands, the Malaita provincial government has used Taiwan’s interest to further its struggle for power and resources.
Fourth, effective influence takes time. It involves attempts to socialise ideas and values, not just spending money. The Chinese authorities – via state and non-state agents – deploy power not only to attempt to change the policies or behaviour of Pacific governments, but also to reshape elite and public opinion. Misinformation and disinformation campaigns are rife, particularly on social media.
Australia playing “whack-a-mole” by trying to counter Chinese spending (think Telstra’s intention to purchase the Pacific’s largest telco Digicel after Huawei expressed an interest) won’t be enough to counter this. Nor will empty rhetoric of being part of a “Pacific family” when Australia is perceived not to take Pacific interests seriously, with climate change again a key – but not sole – example.
The government’s decision to dramatically wind back Australia’s media presence in the Pacific in 2017 has also been counterproductive. Australia went from being the main outside media voice to having its shortwave radio frequencies scooped up by China.
Australia needs to better appreciate the complexity of the Pacific and listen – and try to understand – what a range of Pacific states and peoples tell it about their priorities, concerns, and what they are looking for from Australia. This will involve something new, and probably uncomfortable, for Australia: being humble, empathetic, and admitting its fallibility. But doing so might give it the answers that it so desperately needs to improve its standing in the region…. PACNEWS
*Joanne Wallis is a professor of international security at the University of Adelaide. She receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Department of Defence. Czes Tubilewicz is a senior lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of Adelaide.
