High Court clips businessman Bartlett’s wings on Russell Islands land deal
BUSINESSMAN Alex Bartlett faces the prospect of having to pay back $1 million he advanced from the Copra Export Marketing Authority (CEMA) in a deal to sell a popular beachfront hideaway in West Honiara for $7 million.
The deal involves the titles of some 10 parcel of perpetual estates of premium land in Russell Islands. Mr Bartlett’s effort came unstuck when the High Court threw out his application to transfer the titles to his own name, according to court documents.
Civil Case No. 165 of 2023 was between the Sevev Land Trust Board, John Holosango, Steven Taroniara and Justin Venevii as co-claimants on one side and businessman Alex Bartlett, the Commissioner of Lands and Registrar of Title as co-defendants.
According to court documents, Mr Bartlett had applied to the High Court to have the titles of 10 perpetual estates transferred to his name. These titles cover PN 177-006-4, PN 177-006-3. PN 177-006-1, PN 178-001-1, PN 177-003-2, PN 177-004-3, PN 165-002-121, PN 177-004-2, PN 177-007-1 and PN 177-002-1.
The titles were initially held by the Sevev Land Trust Board, which Mr Bartlett helped to obtain them.
Puisine Judge Justice Lawry handed down the judgement against Mr. Bartlett on 6th September – fifteen days after the case was heard in the High Court on 23rd August this year. The court was told Mr. Bartlett had failed to contest a default judgement registered against him.
The titles have now been returned to the Sevev Land Trust Board, according to the judgement.
“On 23rd June 2023 the Court heard an application for a default judgement. Counsel for the Claimant and counsel for the 2nd and Third Defendants were present, there was no appearance by or on behalf of the First Defendant, the Court heard.
“Judgement was entered by default removing the First Defendant as the proprietor of perpetual estates in PN 177-006-4, PN 177-006-3. PN 177-006-1, PN 178-001-1, PN 177-003-2, PN 177-004-3, PN 165-002-121, PN 177-004-2, PN 177-007-1 and PN 177-002-1 and restoring the name on those titles to Sevev Land Trust Board,” the Judge ruled.
Judge Lawry continued, “On 7th November 2023 a notice of change of advocate was filed on behalf of the First Defendant. On the same day (an) application to set aside the default judgement order was filed together with a sworn statement from the First Defendant.
“In that sworn statement, the First Defendant deposed that he had instructed his former counsel in this matter. He confirmed that on or about 31 October 2023 he engaged Mr. Fa’atoa to represent him and that his former counsel has been overseas for medical reasons.
The First Defendant had expected his former counsel to represent him, the Court was told.
Concerning the claim, he deposed that in 2013, he assisted the late Leslie Morris Asad to
sign transfer instrument of certain parcels of land to the First Defendant. In 2014 he
assisted Mr. Asad to register the Claimant with the Registrar of Companies. He deposed
that he is a member and the Secretary of the First Claimant and is unaware of a decision
by the First Claimant to sue him. He further deposed that Mr Holosango was at all times
aware of his position, duty and role in the First Claimant.
Unfortunately, the First Defendant has been required to engage alternative
representation as Mr Fa’atoa died earlier this year. Counsel for the Claimants has also
changed following former Counsel ceasing practice on being elected as Member of
Parliament.
As a result of the application to set aside the default judgement was not heard until 23 August 2024. Ms Tesua relied on rules 17.55(a) and 17.56 of the Solomon Islands Courts [Civil Procedure] Rule 2007 (the Rules which provide:
17.55 The court may set aside an order at any time if
(a) the order was made in the absence of a party, or 17.56 (if the court sets aside an order, it may also set aside any order made to enforce the order.”
Ms Tesua for the First Defendant submitted that as the order was made in the absence of the First Defendant the order should be set aside. She correctly set out headings that are relevant for the Court to consider being:
(i) whether the cause of the delay is reasonable;
(ii) whether there is an arguable case;
(iii) whether prejudice will be caused by setting aside the default judgement; and
(iv) the nature of the claim
Rule 17.55 however does not deal with the requirements when judgement has been
entered by default. The relevant provision is rule 9.53. Rules 9.52 to 9.55 inclusive provide:
Setting aside default judgement
9.52 A defendant against whom default judgement has been entered by default may apply to the court to have the judgement set aside;
9.53 The application
(a) must set out the reasons why the defendant did not defend the claim; and
(b) must, if the application is made more than three months after the judgement was
entered, explain the delay – and the court shall not set the judgement aside unless it is
satisfied that it is in the interest of justice so to do; and
(c) Consider whether an order for security for costs should be made; and
(d) make any other order necessary for the proper progress of the proceedings
“The considerations set out by counsel then must be applied in light of those rules.
“So far as rule 9.53(d) is concerned the application did have with it a sworn statement in
support of the application from the First Defendant.
“So far as rule 9.53(a) is concerned were the reasons the First Defendant did not defend the claim? He has blamed his former counsel. Whether that is where blame lies or not cannot be assessed as there does not appear to be any evidence from former counsel nor is there any evidence of a waiver of privilege. The claim was served in April 2023 but the First Defendant does not appear to have done anything after the ’Response” has been filed. It is inconceivable that he has not followed up the matter between April 2023 (when served with the claim) and November 2023 (when the application to set aside the default judgement).
“To have made the allegation about the fault being with counsel and to have provided
no evidence of a waiver of privilege raises concern about rule 9.53(b) as well. The Court
must not set aside the judgement unless it is satisfied it is in the interests of justice to do so.
Without confirmation from former counsel the Court cannot be so satisfied, the Judge
Lawry said.
“Rule 9.53(c) requires the defendant in the application to give details of the First
Defendant’s defence in the claim.
“Turning to rule 9.54 I am not satisfied that the First Defendant has shown reasonable
cause for the delay. I cannot know whether he has a meritorious defence about the
claim as I have not seen the details of his defence. The application has not sufficiently
set out the details of that defence. It seems he may have intended to assert that he has
not had knowledge of a fraud or mistake but that also seems to be in conflict with his
evidence that at all times he was the Secretary of the First Claimant. The Court cannot
be put in the position that it is left to guess
“In these circumstances the application to set aside the default judgement is refused.
The First Defendant is to pay the costs of the Claimants and of the Second and Third
Defendant on the standard basis,” the Judge ruled.
Published reports suggest that it was in August this year that Mr. Bartlett was negotiating the sale of Hammock Beach in West Honiara to CEMA. Initial reports suggest CEMA entered into a Sales Agreement with Hatanga Ltd for $7 million.
CEMA and Hatanga Ltd allegedly agreed on a downpayment of $1 million to secure the Hammock Beach site for storage of cocoa and copra from the provinces. Hatanga Ltd had six months to vacate the land by which time CEMA would pay up the balance, according to a report published by Solomon Star on 17th August 2024.
The CEMA Board later denied having approved the deal. It demanded the $1 million down payment be repaid in full. The demand allegedly triggered threat that CEMA would not be allowed to buy copra and cocoa produce from the Russell Islands.
By Alfred Sasako
